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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Barton was the victim of an exceptionally violent crime.

In that case,

three individuals were charged with multiple felonies each for allegedly having attacked
Mr. Barton.
As the cases against Mr. Barton's attackers proceeded, Mr. Barton found himself
in discussions with the lawyer of one of his attackers. That lawyer offered Mr. Barton
money in exchange for Mr. Barton's promise to testify favorably for the lawyer's client.
Although Mr. Barton denies that he ever had the intent to testify falsely, it is undisputed
that he accepted the lawyer's offer. The lawyer then pressured Mr. Barton to recruit
another witness to testify falsely.

After resisting initially, Mr. Barton eventually

acquiesced to that request as well.
As it turns out, the lawyer was working for the police.

He wanted to "burn"

Mr. Barton in order to discredit him so that he could not testify against the lawyer's
client. Thus, Mr. Barton wound up being charged with one count of soliciting perjury (for
his actions in recruiting the other witness to testify falsely), and one count of conspiring
(with the other witness) to commit perjury.
Mr. Barton exercised his right to a jury trial and, at trial, made it clear that he
sought to assert two defenses: (1) innocence (based on lack of intent); and (2)
entrapment. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on the defense of
entrapment.

Thus, Mr. Barton was only able to proceed on his innocence (lack of

intent) theory and, after more than eleven hours of deliberations, although the jury hung
on the conspiracy charge, it found him guilty of solicitation.

1

Mr. Barton now appeals. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in
refusing his requested instruction on the defense of entrapment.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 13, 2009, Robert Barton became the victim of an exceptionally violent
crime.

(See Tr., p.525, L.12 - p.529, L.8.)

After spending time at Kimberly Pena-

Souza's apartment, Mr. Barton had agreed to drive Ms. Pena-Souza's brother to a
nearby theater where the brother was planning on meeting some friends. (Tr., p.525,
L.17 - p.526, L.6.) At the theater, the brother and his friends, including a man named
Chris Taylor (a/k/a Cracky), attacked Mr. Barton, stabbing him at least thirteen times in one of his lungs, in his femoral artery, and in his testicles, among other places - with
a long screwdriver.1 (See Tr., p.526, L.8 - p.527, L.10; Ex. 6 at 6:25 - 6:45. 2) Among
other injuries, Mr. Barton suffered "a collapsed lung, two broken vertebrae, several
broken ribs, [a] concussion, lacerations everywhere, [and] some kidney damage."
(Tr., p.529, Ls.1-5; accord Tr., p.551, Ls.11-21 (Mr. Barton testifying regarding his stab
wounds, and the fact that he nearly died when his lung filled with blood and he
collapsed).) In addition, he suffered excessive blood loss owing to the stab wound to
the major artery in his leg.

(Tr., p.528, Ls.10-18.)

Miraculously though, Mr. Barton

survived; he dragged his broken and bleeding body more than a mile to his home,

The record does not reveal why Mr. Barton was attacked by Mr. Taylor, Ms. PenaSouza's brother, and a third man.
2 In the cited portion of Exhibit 6, Ms. Souza-Pena places her brother at the scene of the
attack on Mr. Barton. Although this portion of the exhibit captures an attorney (Lynn
Dunlap), Ms. Souza-Pena, and Mr. Barton concocting potential false testimony, there
would be no reason for Ms. Souza-Pena to place her brother at the scene unless it was
already well-established that he was, in fact, at the scene, such that she could not
credibly deny his presence.
1

2

where he called for an ambulance. (Tr., p.527, L.18 - p.528, L.9.) Mr. Barton spent
approximately 20 days in the hospital (Tr., p.528, Ls.23-25), but appears to have made
a remarkable recovery (see, e.g., Exs. 4, 6 & 10 (various videos of Mr. Barton, showing
no obvious physical or mental impairments)).
Three individuals (Mr. Taylor, Ms. Pena-Souza's brother, and a third unidentified
individual) were charged with three felonies each (aggravated battery, grand theft, and
burglary) based on the attack on Mr. Barton. (See Tr., p.531, Ls.1 0-21, p.547, L.13 p.548, L.2, p.554, Ls.1-6.) In the case against Chris Taylor, Mr. Taylor was represented
by a defense attorney named Lynn Dunlap.

(Tr., p.206, Ls.7-12.)

In that case, a

preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 7, 2009. (Tr., p.206, L.13-16.) At that
hearing, it was expected that Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena would be called as
witnesses for the prosecution (see Tr., p.206, Ls.19-24), and that they would identify
Mr. Dunlap's client, Mr. Taylor, as one of Mr. Barton's attackers on May 13, 2009 (see
Tr., p.226, L.15-p.227, L.7).
Mr. Dunlap contends that on August 7, 2009, while the various participants were
waiting for Mr. Taylor's preliminary hearing to begin, one of Mr. Taylor's friends,
Wendy Marzitelli, 3 approached him and told him that "Mr. Barton had approached her
and had told her that, for an undisclosed amount of money, his testimony would
change" (presumably in a manner that would be more favorable toward Mr. Taylor than
it would be otherwise). (Tr., p.209, L.14 - p.210, L.15, p.304, L.13 - p.305, L.19.) In
fact, however, it appears that Ms. Marzitelli was the one who initiated the contact by

3 Ms. Marzitelli's last name is spelled alternatively as "Martincelli," "Martzinelli,"
"Marzinelli," and "Marzitelli" in this case. It is not clear which spelling (if any) is correct
but, because "Marzitelli" is the spelling used most frequently in the trial transcript, that is
the spelling that will be used herein.
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approaching Mr. Barton and offering him money in exchange for a change in his
testimony.4 Regardless, Mr. Dunlap told Ms. Marzitelli that he was "interested in that
offer." (Tr., p.210, Ls.19-20.)
Ultimately, Mr. Taylor's August 7, 2009 preliminary hearing was continued. (See
Tr., p.211, L.20 - p.213, L.3.)

Upon leaving the courthouse that day, Mr. Dunlap

approached Mr. Barton and Ms. Marzite/li and "told her everything was fine and [herd
be talking to them later .... " (Tr., p.213, Ls.5-24.) He said that "so that Mr. Barton
would be aware of the fact that [he] knew what was going on and that [they]'d want to
talk." (Tr., p.213, L.21 - p.214, L.1.) According to Mr. Dunlap, Mr. Barton then followed
him to the parking lot, called out his name, and asked for the time. (Tr., p.214, Ls.1-B.)
Mr. Dunlap further asserts that, upon hearing what time it was, Mr. Barton asked: '''We'll
be talking?'" (Tr., p.214, Ls.9-14 (allegedly quoting Mr. Barton).) To that, Mr. Dunlap
says that he responded '''Yes, we will,'" and Mr. Barton then made a hand signal by his
ear, indicating a telephone call. (Tr., p.214, Ls.15-17 (allegedly quoting himself).)5

4 Mr. Dunlap's testimony as to what Ms. Marzitelli told him was not admitted for the truth
of the matter asserted therein, i.e., that Mr. Barton was the one who approached
Ms. Marzitelli, but rather for the limited purpose of showing why Mr. Dunlap behaved as
he did thereafter. (See Tr., p.166, L.21 - p.169, L.23.)
Notably, Mr. Barton then contradicted Mr. Dunlap's testimony in this regard. He
testified that, as he was waiting to testify against Mr. Taylor, Ms. Marzitelli approached
him, told him that "Mr. Taylor's parents had a lot of money," and asked whether he
would be willing to meet with Mr. Taylor's attorney and accept cash in exchange for his
not testifying against Mr. Taylor. (Tr., p.529, L.9 - p.532, L.19.)
Because Mr. Dunlap's testimony on this point was not admitted for the truth of
the matter asserted therein, and because Ms. Marzitelli never testified at Mr. Barton's
trial in this case, Mr. Barton's contention that he was the one approached is not directly
contradicted.
5 Although Mr. Barton acknowledges that, once outside the courthouse, Mr. Dunlap
waved and said that he would be in touch, Mr. Barton apparently denies that he
approached, and spoke to, Mr. Dunlap in the courthouse parking lot. (See Tr., p.534,
Ls.5-10.)
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According to Mr. Dunlap, he was merely playing along, and it was always his
intent to turn the matter over to the police. (See Tr., p.210, Ls.21-23, p.214, L.18 p.215, L.6, p.215, L.22 - p.216, L.214; see a/so Tr., p.305, Ls.20-23 (testifying that he
told Ms. Marzitelli that he intended to "burn him [Mr. Barton] with this"), p.329, Ls.19-24
(same).) Mr. Dunlap claims that, by going to the police, he would fulfill what he thought
was "the ethical obligation[ ] of an attorney, of any upright citizen, of any honest citizen,
and that is, when you see a crime about to be committed, you notify law enforcement
about it, and you make certain that whoever's going to perpetrate that crime is brought
to justice." (Tr., p.330, L.24 - p.331, L.9.) He went on to claim: "I think that's my job as
an attorney, as a human being; and that's what I did as a citizen." (Tr., p.331, Ls.7-9.)
However, Mr. Dunlap did eventually concede that had a second, far less altruistic
objective than trying to "burn" Mr. Barton-trying to obtain an acquittal for the man who
allegedly stabbed Mr. Barton:
I felt by burning Mr. Barton, he would become worthless as a witness to
the state. Same thing with Ms. Souza. By putting on the record that they
had solicited bribes or accepted funds, their credibility at trial relative to my
client [Mr. Taylor] would be minimal; and I anticipated in the long run
Mr. Taylor would be exonerated of the charges, simply because this is
what-[these are] the type of people who are testifying against him,
people would solicit bribes.
(Tr., p.333, Ls.13-23.)

Moreover, Mr. Dunlap readily conceded that, by going to the

police, he knew he would appear to be the innocent party and, thus, he would avoid
criminal liability while retaining his law license. (See Tr., p.330, Ls.9-23, p.331, LS.1316, p.332, L.21 - p.333, L.6, p.335, L.17 - p.336, L.1.) Thus, he says, he returned to
his office and immediately dictated a summary of what he contends happened that day
and, further, he says, he contacted the Idaho Attorney General's office later that day.
(T r., p. 214, L. 18 - p. 215, L. 6, p. 216, L. 11 - p. 217, L. 9.)
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And, indeed, it is clear that Mr. Dunlap did contact the authorities at some point
because a few days later (apparently on August 11, 2009) the local police came to his
office to set up a hidden video camera (with his consent) and provided him with a device
for recording phone calls.

(Tr., p.216, L.11 - p.220, L.5.)

The police "instructed"

Mr. Dunlap to "contact Barton, to have him come in for this first meeting so [the police]
could record it." (Tr., pA97, Ls.13-16; accord Tr., pA98, Ls.6-11.)
With the surveillance equipment in place, Mr. Dunlap placed a call to
Ms. Marzitelli (apparently also on August 11, 2009) in an effort to obtain Mr. Barton's
phone number. (Tr., p.220, Ls.5-17.) Upon his receipt of Mr. Barton's phone number
from Ms. Marzitelli, Mr. Dunlap then called Mr. Barton. (See Tr., p.220, L.17 - p.224,
L.18; Ex.3 (audio recording of call).) During that call, Mr. Dunlap told Mr. Barton that he
wanted to "do a follow-up on what [they] talked about" a few days earlier. (Ex. 3 at 0: 19
- 0:25.) He then went on to explain to Mr. Barton that he wanted him to "deliver a full
loaf" because he was not willing "to pay for just a half loaf."6 (Ex. 3 at 0:44 - 0:50.)
Thereafter, they arranged an in-person meeting at Mr. Dunlap's office for later that day.
(Ex. 3 at 0:54 - 1:38.)
Notably, the first meeting (of three) between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton was not
only recorded by the police department's hidden video camera, but also by Mr. Barton's
Blackberry wireless device. (See Tr., p.545, L.5 - p.547, L.3; Ex. 4 (police department's
video recording); Ex. E, track 2 (Mr. Barton's audio recording).?)

Indeed, Mr. Barton

6 Mr. Dunlap later made it clear that "the loaf" was the case against his client,
Mr. Taylor, and, thus, the two halves of that loaf were the testimony of the two
witnesses who could place his client at the scene of Mr. Barton's stabbing-Mr. Barton
himself, and Kimberly Souza-Pena.
? Exhibit E is a CD containing three audio files. Each file is an audio recording,
surreptitiously made, of one of Mr. Barton's three meetings with Mr. Dunlap. (See
Tr., p.543, L.14 - p.547, L.12.) The file entitled "I" (the recording of the second meeting

6

recorded all of his meetings with Mr. Dunlap because, just as it was Mr. Dunlap's intent
to "burn" him, it was his intent to sting Mr. Dunlap or, as he put it, "to catch a snake," "a
dirty lawyer." (Tr., p.547, Ls.4-12; accordTr., p.549, Ls.7-16. See generally Ex. E.) He
later testified that it was his intent to go to the police and, in fact, early on, actually
attempted to bring this matter to the attention of an investigator he knew at the
prosecutor's office. 8 (Tr., p.535, L.4 - p.536, L.18, p.560, L.3 - p.561, L.7, p.562, LS.59; see also Tr., p.548, LS.17-21 (testifying that, on the day that he was arrested, he was

intending make another attempt to contact the investigator he knew at the prosecutor's
office).) At trial, this assertion was corroborated by the testimony of two individuals
close to Mr. Barton, both of whom testified that he had made contemporaneous
statements as to his intent to go to the police. (See Tr., p.586, LS.10-24 (Carol Jane
Lacombe, Mr. Barton's mother, testifying that Mr. Barton had told her that he'd been
approached by Mr. Taylor's attorney and asked to change his testimony, and that he
was recording his conversations with that attorney intending to turn them over to the
police), p.594, L.22 - p.595, L.1 (Daryl Scott Hays, Mr. Barton's uncle, testifying that
Mr. Barton had told him that he was going to "pick up some money from an attorney and
turn him over to the police").)

(on August 12, 2009)) is referenced herein as "track 1"; the file entitled "Iyn" (the
recording of the first meeting (on August 11, 2009)) is referenced herein as "track 2";
and the file entitled "VN00006-20090817-1135" (the recording of the third meeting (on
August 14, 2009)) is referenced herein as "track 3."
8 Mr. Barton testified that he went to the office of Don Thueson, an individual he knew
from his stabbing case and, therefore, trusted, in order to "tell him [Mr. Thueson] what,
what was going on with this," but that he was told that Mr. Thueson would be out of the
office for a few days. (Tr., p.535, L.4 - p.536, L.18.) He further testified that he did not
seek out another law enforcement officer at that time because he basically did not trust
them to do anything about it. (See Tr., p.536, L.19 - p.537, L.14.)
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At the first (August 11, 2009) meeting between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton,
Mr. Dunlap again expressed his interest in buying a "full loaf," i.e., the testimony not
only of Mr. Barton, but of Ms. Souza-Pena as well.

The relevant portion of that

discussion, which shows that Mr. Barton eventually gave in to Mr. Dunlap's repeated
requests to try to recruit Ms. Souza-Pena, went as follows:
Dunlap: What do you, uh, have in mind?
Barton: I haven't put a whole lot of thought into it yet.
Dunlap: (Laughing.) You had the whole fucking weekend.
Barton: I know.
Dunlap: Which is okay. I-I have no idea what-the biggest
concern I have-not interested in buying a half loaf. And, quite frankly,
there's two of you. There's you and, uh, Pena. Kim.
Barton: Okay, yeah, I don't-I haven't dealt with her. I don't know
anything about what's going on with her.
Dunlap: Because, you know, your identification is, is whatever the
hell you decide to make it. But I ask one of the real questions is how he is
able to see anything out there. And I think, uh, if we end up at trial, I think
that (inaudible) Kim's the one that fingers my guy the hardest. And so
that's how the question there is. I'll take any help I can get. But on the
other hand, I've got to make damn sure that I'm gonna get enough for it to
matter. And the more you want, the more it's gonna matter. So, the
question is you know, I don't know what you have in mind or anything of
the sort.
(At this point, Mr. Barton pulls a notepad and pen out of his breast
pocket, writes something on the top sheet of the notepad, peels the top
sheet off the notepad, and slaps the paper down in front of Mr. Dunlapl
Dunlap: And that buys what?
Barton: Whatever it needs to.
Dunlap: Does it buy her?
Barton: (Shrugging.) I don't know her.
On the paper, Mr. Barton wrote down his price: $15,000. (Tr., p.227, Ls.21-23, p.541,
Ls.1-3.)

9
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Dunlap: Well you know her some. You're over there all fuckin' day
dicking around with, uh, the move.
Barton: Yeah, one day four months ago. I haven't seen her at all
since. I don't know where she is.
Dunlap: Not since?
Barton: (Shaking head.)
Dunlap: So you've not even talked to her about that?
Barton: (Shaking head.)
Dunlap: Okay. Mark-that's his dad-I don't know how much
money he's got. I was paid by mom in California. And, um, she just calls
up, gives me a credit card number and away we go. You have not had
any contact at all with Kim?
Barton: (Shaking head.) No.
Dunlap: Well, I don't know, uh-I've got no problem brokering this
deal. But I am nervous about it. Because, fuck, you know, (gesturing) I've
got that law degree there that cost me about a hundred thousand dollars.
It's what I live off of. And this ain't gonna enhance my pocket at all.
Because I already told him I'll do the case for him. Uh, what I do need,
what I'm thinking about, I anticipate that's within the realm of possibility.
To be straight up with you. The biggest rub, or the biggest question I have
is it's got to be more than just you for that price.
Barton: (Perhaps shaking head once.)
Dunlap: Can you contact her?
Barton: (Shaking head.)
Dunlap: You can't?
Barton: That's me. (Pointing at note.)
Dunlap: I need more than you.
Barton: You're a good lawyer. You'll do fine without me.
Dunlap: (Laughing.)
Barton: (Inaudible.)
Dunlap: Well, that's probably true.

9

Barton: She-I don't think she'll show up.

Dunlap: ... We can either have another meeting, or I can give you
a phone call. It's gonna-like I said, the money's coming in by credit card.
It's going to take a while to get it here. Because, uh, they call it in, we do
the cash deposit, but the bank holds the money for a while, that kind of
shit. Uh, you want to get back together Friday? See if you can find her in
the meantime. Can you do that for me?
Barton: (Nodding.) (Inaudible.)
Dunlap: See if there's anything out there because, uh,
Barton: You'd rather have two birds with one stone with one stone.
I understand.
Dunlap: If they're gonna spend that kind of money, they might as
well spend a little bit more and, you know, buy the whole fuckin' loaf.
Barton: Well that works (inaudible).
Dunlap: (Laughing.) You think so?
Barton: I think so.
Dunlap: Okay. See what you can do for me.
Barton: Will do.
Dunlap: Okay.
(Ex. 4 at 00:50 - 5:47; Ex. E, track 2 at 00:55 - 05:53; see also Tr., p.232, L.18 - p.236,
L.22 (rough transcription of Ex. 4 as it was played for the jury).10)

10 Although the State's recordings of the meetings between Mr. Barton (and, in one
instance, Ms. Souza-Pena) and Mr. Dunlap (Exhibits 4, 6, and 9) were the only ones
played for the jury, Exhibit E, containing Mr. Barton's recordings of those meetings, was
also admitted and, thus, available to the jurors during their deliberations. (See
Tr., p.546, L.14 - p.547, L.3.) Citations are provided to both the State's exhibits and the
defense exhibits because the audio quality of the defense exhibits (the recordings made
by Mr. Barton and included in Exhibit E) is, in the opinion of undersigned counsel,
slightly better that that of the State's exhibits. Furthermore, although citations are
provided for the portions of the trial transcript wherein the State's recordings were
transcribed by the court reporter, because the transcription of these recordings is not
10

Shortly thereafter, unbeknownst to Mr. Dunlap (presumably), both Mr. Barton and
Ms. Souza-Pena were brought in to testify before a grand jury concerning Mr. Barton's
stabbing. 11 (See Tr., p.537, L.25 - p.538, L.19.) In conjunction with that proceeding,
staff from the prosecutor's office had Mr. Barton sit on a bench next to Ms. Souza-Pena
outside the courtroom four approximately four and one-half hours while they waited to
be called as witnesses. (Tr., p.538, Ls.2-7, p.539, Ls.12-17.) It was at this time that
Mr. Barton apparently conveyed Mr. Dunlap's offer to Ms. Souza-Pena. (Tr., p.378, L.9
- p.379, L.20, p.537, L.15 - p.539, L.20, p.564, L.22 - p.565, L.5.)

Nevertheless,

Mr. Barton testified truthfully before the grand jury, identifying Mr. Dunlap's client, Chris
Taylor, as one of his attackers. (Tr., p.538, Ls.17-24, p.563, L.25 - p.564, L.21.)
On August 12, 2009, after the grand jury proceeding, Mr. Barton returned to
Mr. Dunlap's office and, this time, brought Ms. Souza-Pena with him. (See Tr., p.248,
L.23 - p.253, L.3 (discussing the timing of the meeting evidenced by Ex. 6).) At that
meeting, Mr. Dunlap, at the direction of the police, paid Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena
$200 (in recorded bills that had been provided by the police) as "earnest money." (See
Tr., p.260, L.19 - p.261, L.12, p.500, L.24 - p.502, L.7; Ex. 6; Ex. E, track 1; see also
Tr., p.332, L.21 - p.333, L.2 (Mr. Dunlap testifying that his own actions would have been
criminal, but because he took those actions "to advise law enforcement and allow[ ]
them to gather evidence," he lacked criminal intent).) In addition, the parties discussed:
Ms. Souza-Pen a's price for changing her testimony ($5,000); Mr. Dunlap's intention to
provide a further "down payment" (of approximately 10%) on Friday, August 14, 2009;

completely accurate, Mr. Barton requests that this Court rely on the exhibits themselves
in determining what was said at the recorded meeting, rather than the trial transcripts.
11 The record does not show definitively whether the grand jury proceeding occurred
later on August 11, 2009, or early on August 12, 2009. It appears, however, that it
occurred on August 12, 2009. (See Ex. 5 at 0:20- 0:31; Tr., p.241, Ls.13-17.)
11

and how Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena should craft their testimony so as to protect
Mr. Taylor without making it appear obvious that they were perjuring themselves. (See
Ex. 6; Ex. E, track 1.)
The third and final meeting between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton did not occur
until Monday, August 17, 2009.
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(See Tr., p.266, Ls.10-22, p.327, Ls.6-18; see also

Ex. 9 (law enforcement's recording of meeting); Ex. E, track 3 (Mr. Barton's recording of
the meeting).)

At that meeting, Mr. Dunlap made a further "down payment," paying

Mr. Barton an additional $1,000. (Tr., p.267, Ls.14-16, p.294, L.23 - p.295, L.3.) Again,
the money, consisting of recorded bills, had been obtained from the police and was
provided to Mr. Barton at the direction of the police. (Tr., p.327, Ls.13-18, p.502, LS.810, p.456, Ls.7-15.)

Immediately after this meeting, the police arrested Mr. Barton.

(Tr., p.456, Ls.16-17.)
On August 18, 2009, Mr. Barton was charged, by way of a criminal complaint,
with one count of soliciting Ms. Souza-Pena to commit the crime of perjury, and one
count of conspiring with Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury.

(R., pp.9-11.)

After

waiving his preliminary hearing, Mr. Barton was bound over to the district court on both
charges, and the State filed its information on September 18, 2009. (R., pp.62, 63-64,
65, 66-68.)
Approximately a week before commencement of Mr. Barton's trial, his counsel
submitted a request for a jury instruction derived from I.C.J.1. 1513{ TA \I "I.C.J.1. 1513"
\s "I.C.J.1. 1513" \c 1 }, the pattern instruction on the defense of entrapment. (See R.,

12 Ms. Souza-Pena was supposed to have been at this meeting as well; however, she
was running late that day and arrived after Mr. Barton left Mr. Dunlap's office. (See
Tr., p.266, L.15 - p.267, L.16, p.294, 23 - p.295, L.8.)
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pp.142-44.) He also filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of whether there is
sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on entrapment. (R., pp.150-51.)
On August 24, 2009, at the final pretrial conference, defense counsel gave notice
of his intent to discuss the entrapment issue in his opening statement at trial, and he
reiterated his request for an opportunity to present an offer of proof on the entrapment
issue.

(Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.9, L.6, p.10, Ls.11-14.)

Rather than hear evidence or

argument at that time, the district court scheduled a hearing for the following morning.

(See Tr., p.9, L.17 - p.1 0, L.6.)
In the meantime, the State filed an objection to various pretrial requests by the
defense, including Mr. Barton's request for a jury instruction on the defense of
entrapment. (R., pp.180-82.) In support of its objection, the State first asserted that
there was "[n]o reasonable view of the facts contained in the police reports or adduced
in discovery support a claim of entrapment." (R., p.181.) In making this argument, the
State falsely claimed that it was "undisputed" that "Barton approached Dunlap and
concocted the scheme that resulted in his being charged.,,13 (R., p.181.) Second, the
State argued that Idaho law precludes a defendant from denying the intent to commit a
crime while, at the same time, arguing that he was entrapped. (R., p.182.)
On August 25, 2010, the day that Mr. Barton's trial was scheduled to begin, the
district court began by taking up the entrapment issue (as well as other legal issues
which are not relevant to this appeal).

(Tr., p.12, L.1 - p.42, L.12.) At that hearing,

13 Although no testimony had yet been given in this case, the prosecutor knew, or
certainly should have known, that Mr. Barton disputed the allegation that he was the
one who came up with the idea to commit perjury in exchange for money, and that he
was the one who approached Mr. Dunlap. When he was interrogated, Mr. Barton
repeatedly asserted that Mr. Dunlap was the one who approached him. (Ex. 10; see
also Tr., p.476, Ls.20-24, p.479, Ls.3-16, p.480, Ls.1 0-12, p.489, L.19 - p.490, L.6.)
13

defense counsel made it clear that Mr. Barton would not be admitting guilt to the two
charged offenses, but that he should nevertheless be permitted to assert an entrapment
defense because that defense was not inconsistent with his claim of innocence (based
on a lack of intent to follow through with any perjury). (Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.22, L.10.) In
response, the State argued that Mr. Barton's proffered defenses were, in fact,
inconsistent and, therefore, he was precluded from presenting an entrapment defense.
(Tr., p.28, L.3 - p.29, L.2, p.30, Ls.8-13.) Alternatively, the State argued that Mr. Barton
could not have been entrapped because Mr. Dunlap was a private attorney and,
therefore, not an agent of the State. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-18.) In rebuttal, defense counsel
highlighted the evidence suggesting that, although Mr. Dunlap may be a private citizen,
he was certainly acting as an agent of the State in attempting to "sting" Mr. Barton in
this case. (Tr., p.31, L.4 - p.33, L.3.) Counsel also continued to argue that Mr. Barton's
proposed defenses were not actually inconsistent.

(Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.34, L.21.)

Ultimately, the district court denied defense counsel's request for leave to mention the
"entrapment" defense in his opening statement (although it did allow counsel to highlight
the anticipated evidence, including the evidence supporting the entrapment theory14),
concluding that the offer of proof was insufficient to show that Mr. Dunlap was an agent
of the State, or that her persuaded Mr. Barton to engage in a criminal offense which he
was otherwise disinclined to commit. (Tr., p.36, L.1 - p.41, L.6.)
During the ensuing trial, the State offered the testimony of Mr. Dunlap (see
Tr., p.205, L.1 - p.338, L.7), Ms. Souza-Pena (see Tr., p.355, L.1 - p.444, L.7), and

14 As it turned out, this is precisely what defense counsel did, highlighting the facts that
Ms. Marzitelli was the one who originally approached Mr. Barton (purportedly on behalf
of Mr. Dunlap), and that Mr. Dunlap was the one who talked Mr. Barton into enlisting the
assistance of Ms. Souza-Pena. (See Tr., p.199, L.13-p.200, L.1, p.200, Ls.7-9, p.201,
L.21 - p.202, L.10.)
14

Daniel Clements (see Tr., p.445, L.9 - p.508, L. 7), the police officer who directed
Mr. Dunlap's actions in attempting to "sting" Mr. Barton and, later, interrogated Mr.
Barton.

The State also offered various audio and audio/video exhibits.

(See Ex. 3

(audio recording of phone call between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton); Ex. 4 (audio/video
recording of first meeting between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton); Ex. 5 (audio recording of
another phone call between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton); Ex. 6 (audio/video recording of
second meeting between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton, wherein they were joined by Ms.
Souza-Pena); Ex. 9 (audio/video recording of third meeting between Mr. Dunlap and
Mr. Barton); Ex. 10 (audiolvideo of police interrogation of Mr. Barton).) Through these
witnesses and exhibits, the State established most of the facts discussed above.
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the State asked the district court to
address Mr. Barton's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment, and to
finally deny that request. (Tr., p.343, Ls.9-19.) The district court reserved its ruling for
the close of evidence; however, it made it clear that it was disinclined to let the jury
consider a crucial part of Mr. Barton's defense:
at this juncture ... it certainly appears that Mr. Dunlap was not acting on
behalf of the state as an agent. . .. There are certainly references on this
audio that we just listened to about a sting or burning Mr. Barton. Those
things certainly implicate Mr. Dunlap's involvement but not as a state
agent as the record exists, in my view, at this juncture.
(Tr., p.343, L.20 - p.344, L.23.)
In his defense, Mr. Barton exercised his right to testify (see Tr., p.525, L.4 p.578, L.6), and he called two other witnesses-his mother (see Tr., p.580, L.8 - p.591,
L.4) and his uncle (see Tr., p.592, L.1 - p.600, L.16)-to testify.

Further, he offered

additional audio and audio/video exhibits. (See Ex. C (audio/video recording of police
interrogation of Ms. Souza-Pena); Ex. E (audio recordings of Mr. Dunlap's three
15

meetings with Mr. Barton).)

The theory of defense, quite obviously, was that when

Mr. Dunlap came to him and offered him money to commit perjury, and then urged him
to enlist Ms. Souza-Pena in this scheme, he went along with it, not because he intended
for any perjury to be committed, but because he wanted to "burn" Mr. Dunlap, who he
saw as a corrupt defense lawyer, while also bringing down the people who were
instrumental in his having been so brutally attacked. (See, e.g., Tr., p.549, L.7 - p.551,
L.3 (Mr. Barton discussing his intent to bring down Mr. Dunlap, Ms. Marzitelli,
Ms. Souza-Pena, and his three attackers, and explaining that no amount of money in
the world could have persuaded him to lie for these people); see also Tr., p.695, Ls.12-

2D (defense counsel arguing in closing that the bulk of the evidence is not in dispute
and that the physical acts are agreed upon, but "this trial hinges on intent").)15
At the close of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the district court held its final
jury instruction conference.

(Tr., p.646, L.7 - p.662, L.1 D.)

At that time, defense

counsel again argued that the jury should be instructed on the defense of entrapment.
(Tr., p.653, L.16 - p.657, L.11.)

Counsel highlighted the evidence indicating that

Mr. Dunlap was working for law enforcement when he tried to "sting" Mr. Barton in this
case (Tr., p.653, L.22 - p.655, L.3, p.656, Ls.2-21, p.657, Ls.6-11); he again argued
that Mr. Barton's entrapment theory was fully consistent with his claim of innocence
(based on his lack of intent) (Tr., p.655, L.22 - p.656, L.21, p.657, Ls.4-11); and he
argued, in the alternative, that even if Mr. Barton's theories of defense were interpreted
as being inconsistent, this case provides "good cause ... for a modification of the case
law .... " (Tr., p.656, L.23 - p.657, L.4; see also Tr., p.655, Ls.4-21 (pointing out that

15 After the defense rested, the State offered some brief rebuttal testimony. (See
Tr., p.6D9, L.1 - p.617, L.15 (testimony of Kelly Hassani, a police officer called to
controvert one of Mr. Barton's assertions).)
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other jurisdictions have taken a more permissive of alternate defense theories than the
State in this case).)
Ultimately, the district court declined to instruct the jury on the entrapment
defense. (See Tr., p.657, L.13 - p.658, L.21; see generally R., pp.220-39 (post-proof
jury instructions).) The basis of that decision was that the district court did "not believe
entrapment has been established in this record . . . . "

(Tr., p.658, Ls.17-21.)

Specifically, the district court appears to have reasoned that it was Mr. Barton's burden
to prove that the idea for the crime originated with the State, and that Mr. Barton failed
to prove that the police "hatched [the] idea" for either Mr. Barton to testify falsely, or for
Mr. Barton to recruit Ms. Souza-Pena to testify falsely. (Tr., p.657, L.19 - p.658, L.21.)
After the district court delivered its final instructions (see Tr., p.666, L.21 - p.678,
L.13) and counsel delivered their closing arguments (see Tr., p.678, L.19 - p.719, L.12),
the jury retired to begin its deliberations at approximately 10:20 in the morning. (See
Tr., p.720, L.5 - p.721, L.6.) At approximately 9:35 that night, after deliberating for
more than eleven hours, the jury finally came back with a verdict. (See Tr., p.757, L.5p.759, L.7.) As to Count I (solicitation), the jury found Mr. Barton guilty; however, as to
Count" (conspiracy) the jury hung. (R., pp.240-41; Tr., p.760, L.18 - p.761, L.6.) At
that point, the district court declared a mistrial as to Count" (Tr., p.763, Ls.8-17), the
State gave notice of intent not to retry that count and, in fact, moved to dismiss it
(Tr., p.765, L.21 - p.766, L.18), and the district court granted the State's motion,
dismissing Count" (Tr., p.766, Ls.22-25).
On November 1,2010, a sentencing hearing was held. (See generally R., p.251;
Tr., pp.774-803.) At the conclusion of that hearing, the district court imposed upon
Mr. Barton a sentence of five years, with six months fixed, and it ordered that sentence
17

to run consecutively to a sentence in an unrelated case. (R, pp.251, 254; Tr., p.802,
Ls.5-7.) The district court entered its judgment of conviction later the same day. (See

R, pp.252-56.)
On December 10, 2010, Mr. Barton filed a notice of appeal which was timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R, pp.258-60.) On appeal, Mr. Barton contends that the
district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.

18

ISSUE
Did the district court err in refusing Mr. Barton's requested jury instruction on the
defense of entrapment?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of
Entrapment

A.

Introduction
The general standard for giving a jury instruction requested by the defendant is

whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defense theory at issue in that
instruction. This general standard is the standard that has traditionally been applied to
requests for jury instructions on the defense of entrapment in Idaho. For the reasons
set forth in detail below, Mr. Barton contends that this standard was satisfied with regard
to his request for an entrapment instruction in this case, in that there was ample
evidence from which reasonable jurors could have found that he was entrapped.
Accordingly, Mr. Barton submits that the district court erred in refusing to give his
requested entrapment instruction.
Although Mr. Barton contends that his satisfaction of the foregoing standard is
sufficient for this Court to find that the district court erred and remand this case to the
district court for a new trial on the solicitation charge, Mr. Barton anticipates that the
State will attempt to argue that the district court's decision to refuse his requested jury
instruction was correct under the theory that criminal defendants are precluded from
asserting an entrapment defense unless they also admit their guilt. In anticipation of
this argument, Mr. Barton argues below that the entrapment defense is not so limited in
Idaho or, alternatively, to the extent that it is so limited, the case that so holds is unjust
and unwise and should now be overruled. As a third alternative, Mr. Barton asserts that
because his proffered "innocence" and "entrapment" defenses in this case were not
actually inconsistent, even if Idaho does not permit an entrapment defense where that
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defense is inconsistent with the defendant's other defense(s), Mr. Barton's requested
entrapment instruction should have been given in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question of law over which'" Idaho's

appellate courts exercise free review.

Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 750 (2004)

(quoting Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156 (2002)).

C.

The Entrapment Defense Generally
'The defense of entrapment is a judicially created twentieth century American

doctrine that probably evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover
agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offense." 21 Am. Jur.
2d Criminal Law § 206.

Although this defense is not necessarily derived from

constitutional principles and, thus, need not be universally accepted, 16 the reality is that

When discussing the entrapment defense herein, Mr. Barton is referring to the
subjective theory of entrapment, which appears to be the theory of entrapment most
frequently invoked in Idaho. See State v. Mata, 106 Idaho 184,185-86 (Ct. App. 1984).
The subjective theory focuses on the subjective intent of the defendant, requiring the
jury to determine whether a state agent implanted the idea of committing the crime in
the otherwise innocent mind of the defendant (in which case he should be acquitted) or,
instead, whether the state agent merely provided an opportunity an opportunity for the
defendant, who was already predisposed to do so, to commit the crime (in which case
he should be convicted). See id. Under this subjective theory, the defense is not
constitutionally mandated. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 206.
However, it is worth noting that there is also an objective theory of entrapment
(which is not at issue in this case). The objective theory "focuses not on the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime, but instead scrutinizes the government's
investigatory conduct" to determine whether it was so objectively outrageous as to
require an acquittal. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 104-05 (1995). This theory
appears to have constitutional underpinnings, as it may be derived from the right to due
process of law. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 & n.7 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring); Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho at 104-05. Presumably then, it would
necessarily apply in every jurisdiction of the United States.
16
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every jurisdiction in the United States now recognizes it.

See id.

Indeed, Idaho has

recognized entrapment as a defense to criminal liability since at least 1920.

See

State v. Mantis, 32 Idaho 724, _, 187 P. 268, 268-69 (1920).
"Entrapment occurs when 'an otherwise innocent person, not inclined to commit
a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a State agent who, desiring grounds for
prosecution, originates the criminal design and implants in the mind of the innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense.'" State v. Koller, 122 Idaho 409,
411 (1992) (quoting State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816,817 n.1 (1983)) (emphasis
omitted). Thus, it is now recognized that the defense of entrapment has three elements
under Idaho law: (1) "[t]he idea for committing the crime came from an agent of the state
and not from the defendant"; (2) "[t]he state agent[ ] then persuaded" the defendant to
commit the crime (as opposed to merely providing an opportunity for the defendant to
commit the crime); and (3) "[t]he defendant was not ready and willing," i.e., predisposed,
"to commit the crime" in the absence of "the actions of the state agent[ ]." I.C.J.I. 1513;
see also State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 2003) (implicitly holding that
/.C.J.1. 1513 properly states the law of entrapment).

D.

Mr. Barton Was Entitled To The Requested Entrapment Instruction Because A
Reasonable View Of The Evidence Supports Such A Theory Of Defense
Idaho law clearly provides that, "[i]n charging the jury, the court must state to

them all matters of law necessary for their information." /. C. § 19-2132(a) (emphasis
added). Thus, when a jury instruction is requested by a criminal defendant, it must be
given if "'there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would
support' the theory" of defense. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90 (1992) (quoting
State v. Fodge, 121, Idaho 192, 195 (1992)) (quoted with approval in State v. Pearce,
22

146 Idaho 241, 247 (2008)); accord Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 602 (1993) (citing

Eastman for the proposition that "a trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on every
reasonable theory of the litigants which presents a basis for a claim of relief or a
defense, where such theory finds support in the pleadings and the evidence"). 17
With regard to the defense of entrapment, the Idaho courts have long applied the
"reasonable view of the evidence" standard. See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 138 Idaho 768,
772-73 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In order to prevail on his claim of error [asserting that the
district court erred in failing to give an entrapment instruction], the appellant 'must show
that there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented that would support the theory
of entrapment."'); Henry, 138 Idaho at 367 (evaluating the defendant-appellant's claim
that the trial court erred in refusing his requested entrapment instruction under an

Eastman-type standard); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391-92 (Ct. App. 1996) ("We
turn next to Canelo's requested instruction on the defense of entrapment. ... To prevail
on appeal, Canelo must show that there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented
that would support the theory of entrapment. "); State v. Totten, 99 Idaho 117, 118
(1978) ("There being no evidence of entrapment, there was no necessity for the
proposed instruction."); State v. Whitlock, 82 Idaho 540, 541 (1960) ("If the court was of
the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the defense of
entrapment, it was his duty to instruct the jury in regard thereto."); State v. Garde, 69
Idaho 209, 211 (1949) ("Appellant contended that the testimony of the plaintiff's
witnesses established entrapment and accordingly requested instructions on that
defense. The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that the appellant was given

17 Obviously though, the district court need not give the defendant's requested jury
instruction if it misstates the law, is cumulative to other instructions, or constitutes an
impermissible comment on the evidence. See Henry, 138 Idaho at 367.
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the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse to do so and that he chose to sell. There
was no entrapment and the requested instructions were properly refused."); State v.
Webster, 46 Idaho 798, _, 271 P. 578, 578 (1928) ("The only point on which the appeal
is predicated is the failure to give a requested instruction on entrapment. . .. There
being no evidence of entrapment, there was no necessity for the proposed instruction.");
State v. Chacon, 37 Idaho 442, _,216 P. 725, 726-27 (1923) ("Appellant complains of
the refusal of the court to give to the jury the requested instruction covering the law
relating to the question of entrapment. In the absence of evidence of an entrapment, it
was not error to refuse the requested instruction."); State v. White, 33 Idaho 697,

,

197 P. 824, 825 (1921) ("[IJnstructions 7 to 11, inclusive, were offered upon the theory
that a trap had been laid for appellant by the sheriff and his deputies. An examination of
the record fails to disclose any competent evidence which supports the theory of the
appellant that the officers lured him into the commission of the offense for which he was
convicted .... The court did not err in refusing to give appellant's requested instructions
Nos. 7 to 11.").
In this case, because there was substantial evidence tending to show that
Mr. Dunlap was an agent of the State of Idaho who not only came up with the idea of
having Mr. Barton solicit Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury, but also encouraged him to
do so in the face of his protestation. There was also sUbstantial evidence tending to
show that Mr. Barton was not predisposed to commit that offense.
First, although Mr. Dunlap is obviously not a police officer, there is substantial
evidence from which a jury could have found him to have acted as an agent of the State
of Idaho in this case. Mr. Dunlap testified that he took the actions that he did in this
case "to advise law enforcement and allow[ J them to gather evidence" against
24

Mr. Barton. (Tr., p.332, L.21 - p.333, L.2.) Furthermore, he made it abundantly clear
that he assisted law enforcement in this regard, at least in part, to generate a criminal
case against Mr. Barton. (See Tr., p.333, L.7 - p.334, L.9 (testifying that one of his goal
was to "burn" Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena so that they would not be credible
witnesses against his client, and agreeing with Mr. Barton's counsel that another goal
was "to prosecute these two people"); see also Tr., p.330, L.24 - p.331, L.9 (testifying
that he felt he had a moral and ethical obligation to assist the police in this case).)
Finally, it is indisputable that Mr. Dunlap took his directions from, and relied upon the
assistance of, law enforcement.

(See, e.g., Tr., p.217, L.1 - p.220, L.8 (Mr. Dunlap

making it clear that he waited four days-until he could coordinate with law
enforcement-before taking any substantial steps in furtherance of his plan to "burn"
Mr. Barton), p.497, Ls.13-16 (Det. Clements testifying that he "instructed" Mr. Dunlap to
make the initial phone call to Mr. Barton, and "to have him [Mr. Barton] come in for the
first meeting so [the police] could record it"), p.498, Ls.1-11 (same), p.219, L.7 - p.220,
L.5 (Mr. Dunlap explaining that local law enforcement supplied the surveillance
equipment used in this case, and even came to his office to set it up), p.497, Ls.22-25
(Det. Clements testifying that the police operated the video camera used to record the
meetings between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton), p.260, L.19 - p.261, L.12 (Mr. Dunlap
testifying that the original $200 in "earnest money" paid to Mr. Barton and Ms. SouzaPena was provided by law enforcement), p.502, LS.8-10 (Det. Clements testifying that
the police "directed" Mr. Dunlap to pay Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena $200 "as a
partial down payment), p.327, Ls.13-18 (Mr. Dunlap testifying that the police provided
him with another $1,000 to pay to Mr. Barton and Ms. Souza-Pena), p.456, LS.7-15
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(Det. Clements testifying to the same). Indeed, the fact that Mr. Dunlap was working for
law enforcement is well-illustrated by the following testimony from Detective Clements:
We directed [Mr. Dunlap] to do those things. I'm not saying he would have
done those things without us. We provided him that money. We provided
him the instruction to give that money to them. I don't think that he would
have done that on his own. Those were instructions we provided.
(Tr., p.501, Ls.14-20.)
Second, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could have found that
Mr. Dunlap was the one who came up with the idea to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena to commit
perjury. As discussed above, during Mr. Dunlap's first phone call to Mr. Barton, he
brought up his desire to purchase a "full loaf," not just "a half loaf." (Ex. 3 at 0:44 0:50.) Later, at Mr. Dunlap's first meeting with Mr. Barton, he quickly brought up the
"loaf" analogy again and, lest there have been any confusion, specified that when he
spoke of the other "half loaf," he was talking about Ms. Souza-Pena's testimony. (Ex. 4
at 1:05 - 1:15.) As noted above (and as discussed in further detail below), throughout
the course of that meeting, Mr. Dunlap continued to press Mr. Barton to solicit
Ms. Souza-Pena to sell her testimony. (See Ex. 4 at 1: 15 - 5:47.)
Third, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could have found that
Mr. Dunlap did more than simply provide Mr. Barton with an opportunity to solicit
Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury; it could have found that Mr. Dunlap actually
persuaded Mr. Barton to do so. The recording of the first meeting between Mr. Dunlap

and Mr. Barton shows that Mr. Barton was initially reluctant to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena,
and it was only after Mr. Dunlap asked him repeatedly to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena that he
indicated he would try to do so. When Mr. Dunlap first broached the subject of bringing
Ms. Souza-Pena into the fold, Mr. Barton suggested he would not be able to help
Mr. Dunlap in this regard, stating: "Okay, yeah, I don't-I haven't dealt with her. I don't
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know anything about what's going on with her." (Ex. 4 at 1: 15 - 1:20.) A short while
later, after learning Mr. Barton's price, Mr. Dunlap asked if that price included
Ms. Souza-Pena's perjury as well, and Mr. Barton told him "I don't know her." (Ex. 4 at
2:26 - 2:30.) Then, when Mr. Dunlap challenged Mr. Barton on this point, Mr. Barton
stuck to his guns repeatedly, insisting that he had not seen her lately and did not know
where she was (Ex. 4 at 2:30 - 3:20), thereby suggesting that he was not interested in
fulfilling Mr. Dunlap's request. Moments later, when Mr. Dunlap told Mr. Barton that "it's
got to be more than just you for that price," Mr. Barton appeared to shake his head;
when Mr. Dunlap asked Mr. Barton to contact Ms. Souza-Pena, Mr. Barton clearly
shook his head; and when Mr. Dunlap asked again, Mr. Barton responded by pointing to
the paper on which he had written his price and stated "that's me," thereby indicating to
Mr. Dunlap that he was willing to sell only his testimony.

(Ex. 4 at 4:06 - 4:17.)

Thereafter, Mr. Dunlap pleaded "I need more than you"; in response, Mr. Barton not
only demurred, but suggested that he was unwilling to deal with Mr. Dunlap if
Mr. Dunlap insisted on him enlisting the assistance of Ms. Souza-Pena: "You're a good
lawyer. You'll do fine without me." (Ex. 4 at 4:20 - 4:26.) Moments later, Mr. Barton
suggested that Mr. Dunlap did not need Ms. Souza-Pena's complicity anyway, stating "I
don't think she'll show up." (Ex. 4 at 4:31 - 4:35.) Ultimately though, as the meeting
reached its conclusion, Mr. Dunlap stated: "See if you can find her in the meantime.
Can you do that for meT and Mr. Barton nodded his head and said something,18 finally
evidencing some openness to the idea of soliciting Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury.

18 It is not clear to undersigned counsel-from either Exhibit 4 or Exhibit E, track 2what Mr. Barton said at this point in the meeting; however, it is possible that his
response included the word "yes," which would be consistent, of course, with the nod of
his head.
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(Ex. 4 at 5:19 - 5:25.) Thereafter, Mr. Barton made a number of comments that were
consistent with his having come around to Mr. Dunlap's request. (See Ex. 4 at 5:25 5:47.) Thus, a reasonable juror could certainly have concluded that Mr. Dunlap did
much more than just provide Mr. Barton an opportunity to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena; a
reasonable juror could have found that Mr. Barton was persuaded to do so by
Mr. Dunlap's persistent requests.
Fourth, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could have found that
Mr. Barton was not predisposed to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury.
Mr. Barton sustained life threatening injuries in a violent attack perpetrated by three
individuals, including Mr. Dunlap's client (see Tr., p.526, L.11 - p.529, L.8), so one
would naturally expect Mr. Barton to want to put the responsible parties behind bars,
and would therefore, not be inclined to solicit the perjury that would allow those
individuals to go free. Indeed, Mr. Barton had already testified against his attackers on
three different occasions (Tr., p.550, Ls.7-16); he stated that it was his desire to see his
attackers punished (Tr., p.549, L.7 - p.550, L.19); he indicated that, regardless of any
illicit deals he may have cut with Mr. Dunlap, whom he believed to be a dirty lawyer, he
always intended to testify against Mr. Dunlap's client (Tr., p.549, Ls.23-25) and, in fact,
would not have accepted any amount of money to not testify against his client
(Tr., p.550, L.20 - p.551, L.3); and Mr. Barton expressed frustration with the fact that
the State had dismissed the charges against his attackers (see Tr., p.531, Ls.8-25,
p.553, L.3 - p.554, L.16).
Furthermore, the evidence in this case reveals that Mr. Barton was, or at least
believed he had been, approached by Mr. Dunlap; there is no direct evidence indicating
that Mr. Barton initiated any of this. (See note 4, supra (explaining that Mr. Dunlap's
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testimony that Ms. Marzitelli told him that Mr. Barton had approached her was not
admitted for the truth of what Ms. Marzitelli told him).) Thus, it is unlikely that a juror
would reason that Mr. Barton initiated the sale of his own testimony and, thus, was
predisposed to sell Ms. Souza-Pen a's testimony.
Even if the jurors believed that Mr. Barton had initiated the sale of his own
testimony to Mr. Dunlap (whether based on circumstantial evidence or misuse of
Mr. Dunlap's testimony), such a finding would not necessarily be inconsistent with
Mr. Barton's assertion that he never actually intended to follow through with his
agreement with Mr. Dunlap and, thus, never intended to testify falsely at Mr. Taylor's
trial. Indeed, Mr. Barton's testimony in this regard appears to have carried some weight
with the jury, given that the jury hung on the conspiracy charge, seemingly because it
was deadlocked on the question of whether Mr. Barton actually intended that any
perjured testimony be given at Mr. Taylor's trial. (See Tr., p.745, Ls.1-23 (indicating
that, after deliberating for nearly ten hours, the jury requested additional guidance as to
the specific intent element of conspiracy charge); Court's Ex. 6 (same).) As such, even
a conclusion that Mr. Barton was the one who initiated the original agreement with
Mr. Dunlap is wholly consistent with the conclusion that Mr. Barton was reluctant to
solicit Ms. Souza-Pena.

Although he could safely enter into an agreement with

Mr. Dunlap and retain control of his own fate (i.e., he could either take Mr. Dunlap's
money and then renege on the agreement and testify truthfully against Mr. Dunlap's
client, or he could go to the police and expose Mr. Dunlap), as soon as he brought
Ms. Souza-Pena into the fold, he would lose control of the situation (because he could
not know that she would testify truthfully against Mr. Dunlap's client and, in fact, would
have reason to fear that she would not, and because if he went to the police and
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"burned" both Mr. Dunlap and Ms. Souza-Pena, he would risk destroying the credibility
of Ms. Souza-Pena's testimony against Mr. Taylor, even assuming she testified
truthfully).

Thus, for Mr. Barton to acquiesce to Mr. Dunlap's requests to bring

Ms. Souza-Pena into the fold, he had to be ready to risk losing one of his major
objectives-obtaining his attacker's conviction. As this was a sUbstantial leap beyond
merely entering into an agreement with Mr. Dunlap in the first place, the fact that
Mr. Barton had such an agreement with Dunlap (or even sought out such an agreement
with Mr. Dunlap) is in no way probative of any predisposition to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena's
perjury.
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Barton submits that a reasonable view of the
evidence would support a jury's finding that he was entrapped and, thus, the district
court was required to have given his requested jury instruction on the defense of
entrapment.

E.

The Fact That Mr. Barton Asserted His Innocence In This Case Should Have
Been No Barrier To Presentation Of An Entrapment Theory Of Defense
Typically, if a defendant asserts on appeal that the district court erred in refusing

to provide the jury with a requested instruction, the inquiry ends after the appellate court
determines that either a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defendant's
theory (in which case the appellate court will find error), or that it does not (in which
case the appellate court will find no error). See Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90. However,
Mr. Barton anticipates that the State will argue that that determination does not end this
Court's inquiry; he anticipates that the State will assert that, regardless of what the
evidence showed, Mr. Barton was not entitled to an entrapment defense in this case
because he maintained his innocence.

This anticipated argument will stem from an
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outdated rule, unique to the entrapment context, which holds that a defendant's claim of
innocence is inconsistent with the defense of entrapment and, therefore, a defendant
may not present an entrapment defense to the jury unless he is willing to otherwise
admit his guilt.
Below, Mr. Barton explores this remarkable limitation on the entrapment defense,
discusses the cases bearing on the question of whether this limitation applies in Idaho,
and argues that this limitation does not, in fact, apply in Idaho. Alternatively, Mr. Barton
asserts that because this limitation on the entrapment defense is unwise and unjust, to
the extent that it is the law in Idaho, it should now be rejected. Mr. Barton also argues
that, even if Idaho law embraces this limitation going forward, it should be deemed not
to apply in his case because, although he sought to assert his innocence and present
an entrapment defense, those two defense theories were not necessarily inconsistent.

1.

The General Standard And The Trend: Courts Are Moving Away From
The Prohibition Against Defendants Presenting Inconsistent Alternative
Theories Of Defenses (When One Of Those Theories Is Entrapment)

"[I]t was once uniformly held that the defense of entrapment was not available to
one who denied the commission of the offense .... " 5 A.L.R. 4th 1128 § 2(a). The
theory of this limitation on the entrapment defense, apparently, is that "it is too
inconsistent for an accused to claim that he did not commit the acts charged and to
simultaneously say that he was entrapped into committing those acts." Id.
Although this limitation on the entrapment defense may still be the rule in the
majority of jurisdictions, 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 213, it "has come under attack in
recent years and has in some instances been discarded," 5 A.L.R. 4th 1128 § 2(a).
One notable example of the modern trend toward rejecting this rule is the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
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In

Mathews,19 the Supreme Court held that in federal court, "even if the defendant denies

one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever
there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment." Id. at
62.

In so holding, the Court noted that, where alternative theories are allowed in

virtually every other context, there is no valid justification for prohibiting alternative
theories in cases where a criminal defendant seeks to assert an entrapment defense.
See id. at 63-66.

Numerous other jurisdictions also allow now defendants to pursue an entrapment
defense without admitting their guilt.

See, e.g., People v. Perez, 401 P.2d 934, 937

(Cal. 1965) ("We disagree with the Attorney General's contention that to invoke the
defense of entrapment a defendant must admit committing the criminal acts charged.
Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty ... it does not
follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense."); State v.
Harrington, 332 So.2d 764, 767 (La. 1976) ("[T]he State argues that the defendant

cannot rely on the defense of entrapment and at the same time deny committing the
crime.

Thus, the State argues, the defendant in this case, who denied giving any

money to the officer, cannot also be heard to say that she was entrapped into giving him

19 The facts of Mathews are remarkably similar to those in this case. In Mathews, law
enforcement (the FBI) arranged for a citizen informant (the president of a small
business) to offer the defendant, a government (Small Business Administration)
employee a loan, which the government contended was really a bribe. See Mathews,
485 U.S. at 60-61. At trial, the defendant testified on his own behalf, admitting the act
alleged, i.e., acceptance of the money from the informant, but insisted that that money
was truly a loan and, thus, denied the intent provide the informant preferential treatment
based on that loan. See id. at 61. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the
defense of entrapment, reasoning that the defense was not available because the
defendant had not admitted all of the elements (including the requisite mental state) of
the charged offense. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed on the same grounds. Id. at 62.
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money.. "

However, this approach has been rejected by several courts .... There is

no logical reason why the defendant should not be allowed to show that the entire plan
involved in this case constituted a governmental attempt to entrap persons into
committing the crime of bribery, even though she claims she did not bribe the officer,
but that he took the money away from her when she refused to pay the bribe.);

Hopson v. State, 625 S02d 395, 400 (Miss. 1993) ("Notwithstanding the wellestablished rule in Mississippi that a defendant must admit the offense with which he or
she is charged before being permitted to submit an entrapment instruction to the jury,
we now abolish that requirement and will follow the rule announced in Matthews . ... ");

Commonwealth v. Tracey, 624 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass. 1993) ("We conclude that, if the
judge based his refusal to give an entrapment instruction on the ground that the
defendant may not claim entrapment while also denying committing the crime, it was
error."); State v. Branam, 390 A2d 1186, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct., AD. 1978) ("[W]e are
persuaded that the defendant should be permitted to deny commission of any crime and
also raise the defense of entrapment."), aff'd 399 A2d 299 (N.J. 1979); People v.

Johnston, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 198, 203 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. AD. 1975) ("[I]n New York a
defendant may raise inconsistent defenses and may not be compelled to admit his guilt
as a condition of invoking the defense of entrapment .... "); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d
1086, 1088 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("A defendant need not admit that he committed a
crime, or any of its elements, in order to use the entrapment defense. "). Cf People v.

D'Angelo, 257 N.W. 2d 655, 660 (Mich. 1977) ("Since our test for entrapment does not
look to the defendant's so-called predisposition to commit the crime charged but
focuses instead upon the challenged governmental activity, the defendant will not be
required to admit the criminal act in order to raise the entrapment issue.");
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Commonwealth v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1149-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting,
based on state statute, common law limitation on entrapment defense which required
defendant to admit guilt before invoking defense); Martinez v. State, 580 P.2d 968, 971
(N.M. 1978) ("We ... hold that where the defendant has admitted some elements of an
offense, although not all, and where the denial of the other elements is factually not
repugnant to the defense of entrapment, the trial court must issue an instruction on
entrapment.") .

2.

Idaho Law Is Uncertain When It Comes To The Question Of Whether
There Is A Prohibition Against Defendants Presenting Inconsistent
Alternative Theories Of Defense (When One Of Those Theories Is
Entrapment)

Mr. Barton contends that Idaho law is somewhat confused when it comes to the
question of whether there is a prohibition against defendants presenting inconsistent
alternative theories of defense when one of those theories is entrapment, and he
asserts that this Court should hold that no such prohibition exists.

Alternatively, he

argues that, if the prohibition does exist, whatever case(s) createdlrecognized it should
now be overruled and Idaho law should now be brought in line with the modern trend of
allowing defendants to assert alternative defense theories, even if those theories are
inconsistent.

a)

Idaho Law Does Not Prohibit Defendants From Presenting
Inconsistent Alternative Theories Of Defense (When One Of Those
Theories Is Entrapment)

Interestingly, while the modern trend is to move away from the prohibition against
defendants presenting the alternative theories of innocence and entrapment, Idaho has
arguably moved backward in this regard. Throughout the last century, Idaho's appellate
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courts have consistently identified only one criterion for the giving of an entrapment
instruction: whether a reasonable view of the evidence would support the theory of
entrapment. (See Part 0, supra (compiling cases applying the "reasonable view of the
evidence" standard).) In fact, at least one reported case has applied this sole criterion
even though the defendant testified that he had not committed the offense with which he
had been charged. In State v. Garde, supra, where the defendant was charged with the

unlawful sale of liquor, he testified that he was not involved in the sale in question and,
in fact, denied even being present at the location of the sale at the time testified to by
the police; nevertheless, because he contended that the testimony of the prosecution's
witnesses established entrapment, he requested a jury instruction on that defense.
Garde, 69 Idaho at 211. That request was denied, the defendant was found guilty, and

the defendant appealed, contending that it was error for the trial court to have denied
his request for an entrapment instruction.

Id.

Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court

affirmed the defendant's conviction-not because Idaho law precluded him from
presenting inconsistent alternate defense theories, but because the State's evidence
"disclosed that the [defendant] was given the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse
to do so and that he chose to sell" and, thus, "[t]here was no entrapment." Id. Thus, the
Garde Court implicitly rejected the traditional rule that a defendant who asserts his

innocence is precluded from presenting an entrapment defense. Accordingly, at least
as of 1949, Idaho appears to have been ahead of its time.
However, based on a series of cases concerning Dr. Charles Suits, a physician
who apparently got mixed up with illegal drugs, it is arguable that Idaho has since
regressed. In 2002, following a "sting" involving an informant and an undercover police
officer,

Dr. Suits,

was found

guilty of possession of a controlled
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substance

(methamphetamine).

See Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 161 (Ct. App. 2006)

(hereinafter Suits II). Although it is unclear precisely what evidence came out during
Dr. Suits' criminal trial, it is reasonably clear that his counsel never presented an
entrapment defense at that trial. 2o See id. at 161, 163, 164-65. Ultimately, Dr. Suits'
conviction was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Id.
In the meantime, the Idaho State Board of Medicine had suspended Dr. Suits'
medical license, Dr. Suits had appealed that decision to district court (where the Board's
decision was affirmed), and Dr. Suits had appealed again, this time to the Idaho
Supreme Court. Suits v. Idaho Board of Professional Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 398-99
(2003) (hereinafter Suits I). It is not clear what evidence or arguments were advanced
at the evidentiary hearing on Dr. Suits' license suspension; however, at least by the time
his case was before the Idaho Supreme Court, Dr. Suits apparently "attempt[ed] to raise
the entrapment defense as a shield."21

Id. at 399-400. The Supreme Court though,

declined to reach the merits of this entrapment defense on the following basis:
Dr. Suits has never admitted that he committed any of the underlying
offenses. 22 His offense that the criminal offense did not happen is

20 The details of the criminal case are unclear, in part, because Dr. Suits' direct appeal
resulted in an unpublished opinion. See Suits II, 143 Idaho at 161. Thus, the only thing
that is clear about the direct appeal is that Dr. Suits' conviction was affirmed. See id.
21 Strangely, in Suits I, the Idaho Supreme Court asserted that "Dr. Suits was given the
opportunity to present evidence in support of his entrapment claim, but the jury in the
criminal trial rejected the entrapment defense." Suits I, 138 Idaho at 400 n.2. However,
as noted, in Suits II, the Idaho Supreme Court made it reasonably clear that Dr. Suits'
defense attorneys had declined to pursue an entrapment defense in his criminal trial.
See Suits II, 143 Idaho at 161, 163, 164-65.
22 Although it is not entirely clear, Mr. Barton presumes that, by mentioning Dr. Suits'
"offenses" in the plural form, the Supreme Court was referring to the Medical Practice
Act (I.C. §§ 54-1801 through -1820) violations alleged in the eight-count disciplinary
complaint filed by the Board of Professional Discipline in the licensing proceeding, see
Suits I, 138 Idaho at 399, not the single offense alleged in the one-count (presumably)
complaint filed by the State of Idaho in the criminal case, see Suits II, 143 Idaho at 161.
This presumption is bolstered by the fact that, in the very next sentence in Suits I, the
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inconsistent with his claim on appeal that he was entrapped into
committing the crime. Therefore, he is not in a position to assert the
entrapment defense. See State v. Mata, 106 Idaho 184, 185-186, 677
P.2d 497, 498-499 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that entrapment defense
necessarily implies that defendant admits to engaging in the criminal
acts).23
Suits I, 138 Idaho at 400.

Following the Court of Appeals' affirmance of Dr. Suits' conviction, as well as the
Supreme Court's affirmance of his license suspension, Dr. Suits filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in his
criminal case when his defense counsel failed to properly pursue an entrapment
defense by requesting a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. See Suits II, 143
Idaho at 161, 162. Dr. Suits' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied after an
evidentiary hearing.

Id.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, after discussing at some

length the now-eroded rule that a defendant who denied guilt may not assert an
entrapment defense, relied on the above-quoted language from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Suits I and held that it was "constrained to follow the Supreme Court's
indication in [Suits

~

that Idaho follows the rule prohibiting inconsistent defenses." Suits

II, 143 Idaho at 162-64. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision

denying Dr. Suits' request for post-conviction relief. Id. at 165.
Based on the Supreme Court's language in Suits I, and the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Suits I in Suits II, it is certainly arguable that, just as other jurisdictions

Supreme Court goes on to separately discuss "the criminal offense." See Suits I, 138
Idaho at 399.
23 Contrary to the Supreme Court's suggestion, nothing in Mata supports the proposition
that a defendant may not utilize the entrapment defense unless he first admits to
committing the underlying offense(s). Although some authorities do support this
conclusion, Mr. Barton respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals' Mata decision is
not one of them.
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are rejecting the traditional rule that criminal defendants may not assert inconsistent
alternative defenses, Idaho has finally adopted that rule. Mr. Barton, however, asserts
that Suits I does not support such a conclusion, and that Suits II, therefore, represents a
mistaken recitation of the law. Mr. Barton contends that, in Idaho, defendants may now,
and always have been allowed to, assert an entrapment defense even while claiming
innocence.
As noted above, Suits I was an appeal of an Idaho State Board of Medicine
disciplinary decision. As such, it was an appeal of an administrative decision and, thus,
a civil case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's discussion of an "entrapment" defense in
that case should not necessarily be extended to the realm of criminal law. Given that
the question presented in that case (and explicitly left unanswered by the Supreme
Court) is "whether an entrapment defense is available in administrative cases," it is
certainly conceivable that any entrapment defense that may be deemed to apply in
administrative cases would be far more limited than that which applies in criminal cases.
Furthermore, as is also noted above, for nearly one hundred years Idaho had
recognized and repeatedly discussed an entrapment defense without ever having
identified a limitation for cases in which the defendant asserts his innocence. In fact, in
Garde, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the entrapment defense may, in

fact, be utilized even where the defendant asserts his innocence. See Garde, 69 Idaho
at 211. Given this historical backdrop, it seems highly improbable that the Supreme
Court would have fundamentally altered Idaho criminal law, not only in a civil case, but
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with virtually no discussion of the competing arguments for and against the limitation of
the entrapment defense adopted. 24
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Barton contends that Suits / neither recognized, nor
adopted, any sort of limitation on the entrapment defense in the criminal context.
Accordingly, he respectfully submits that, in Suits II, the Court of Appeals misread

Suits / and, therefore, erred in holding "that Idaho follows the rule prohibiting
inconsistent defense." Finally, he contends that, in light of Garde, as well as the long
line of Idaho cases holding (whether they did so explicitly or implicitly) that an
entrapment instruction is required whenever there is a "reasonable view of the
evidence" which supports an entrapment theory, in criminal cases at least, there is no
prohibition against presentation of alternate, even inconsistent, theories of innocence
and entrapment.

Thus, Mr. Barton contends that there is no barrier to this Court

concluding that the district court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the
defense of entrapment.

I.
a)
b)

To The Extent That Idaho Law Prohibits Defendants From
Presenting Inconsistent Alternative Theories Of Defense (When
One Of Those Theories Is Entrapment), That Prohibition Is Unjust
And Unwise And Ought To Be Eliminated

The Supreme Court cited to only one case, Mata, supra, in support of its contention
that Dr. Suits was "not in a position to assert the entrapment defense" because he
"never admitted that he committed any of the underlying offenses." See Suits /, 138
Idaho at 400. However, as discussed above, Mata does not support that proposition.
(See note 24, supra.)
24
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As discussed in the preceding subsection, Mr. Barton contends that Idaho law
does not prohibit defendants from presenting alternate theories of innocence and
entrapment, even if those theories happen to be inconsistent. However, to the extent
that this Court holds otherwise, and determines that Idaho law does prohibit the
presentation of such alternate theories of defense, Mr. Barton asserts that Idaho law on
this issue is unjust and unwise and should, therefore, be overruled. See Reyes v. Kit
Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240 (1998) ("[T]he rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow
[controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to
be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.").
As noted, the theory behind the old rule requiring defendants to admit guilt before
being allowed to present an entrapment defense was that "it is too inconsistent for an
accused to claim that he did not commit the acts charged and to simultaneously say that
he was entrapped into committing those acts." 5 A.L.R. 4th 1128 § 2(a). The Arizona
Supreme Court has explained this perceived inconsistency as follows:
First, the Mathews rule fosters perjury and more litigation. Under
Mathews, a defendant may take the stand and testify that he did not do
the act. The jury is instructed not only on the elements of entrapment but
the elements of the crime itself. To allow a defendant to testify as to two
defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning a
defendant's perjury. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 72, 108 S.Ct. at 891. (White, J.,
dissenting).
Second, allowing inconsistent defenses may confuse the jury. What
must the jury think when the defendant testifies that he had nothing to do
with the sale of narcotics and then the defendant's attorney tells the jury
that, yes, the defendant did commit the crime but was entrapped? As
Justice White noted in his dissent in Mathews:
Finally, even if the Court's decision does not result in
increased perjury at criminal trials, it will-at the very leastresult in increased confusion among criminal juries. The
lower courts have rightly warned that jury confusion is likely
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to result from allowing a defendant to say, "I did not do it"
while his lawyer argues "He did it, but the government
tricked him into it."
Id.

State v. Soule, 811 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. 1991).
Several courts, however, have rightly labeled these concerns "illusory."

For

example, the court in McGuire, supra, stated as follows:
As several courts have recognized, the common-law rule is
predicated upon the belief that an individual cannot logically deny the
commission of an offense and at the same time claim entrapment. We are
persuaded, however, that this alleged "logical" inconsistency is, in fact,
illusory. As the McBride court observed, the apparent inconsistency stems
merely from the fact that a finding of entrapment depends on an
antecedent determination that the criminal act was indeed committed; a
jury cannot ultimately conclude that the accused did not commit a crime
and that he was entrapped into committing it. [State v. McBride, 287 Or.
315,319-20 (1979).] On the other hand, an accused's own testimony may
be internally consistent and still create a reasonable doubt both as to the
commission of a crime and the propriety of the police agent's conduct. For
example, a defendant charged with purchasing an illegal drug may claim
that a police officer or agent tried to convince him to purchase the drug,
but that he nevertheless resisted. Because the fact-finder is free to believe
all, part, or none of the defendant's testimony, the testimony could support
an acquittal on either of two grounds: (1) the defendant did not purchase
the drug, or (2) the defendant was entrapped into purchasing the drug.
Commonwealth v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); see also
State v. Branam, 390 A.2d 1186, 1190-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. A.D. 1978) (quoting the Chief
Justice Traynor's reasoning in Perez, supra, for the proposition that "this alleged 'logical'
inconsistency" in allowing defendants to assert their innocent while also asserting an
entrapment defense, "is, in fact, illusory"). Indeed, as these courts have observed, it is
for the jury to evaluate the evidence, which mayor may not be disputed, and which may
or may not be consistent, and from that evidence, determine the facts. There is nothing
inherently inconsistent or confusing about presenting a jury with evidence that happens
to conflict, instructing it on the law, and allowing the jury to go about its task of finding
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the facts and applying the relevant law to the facts found. After all, this is precisely what
is done in every other case. As a majority of the United States Supreme Court pointed
out in Mathews, supra, "[t]hese same concerns are ... present in the civil context, yet
inconsistency is expressly allowed under the" rules of civil procedure. Mathews, 485
U.S. at 65. And, of course, these concerns are also present in criminal cases involving
other defenses, such as self-defense, but there is no analogous prohibition against
inconsistent defenses in those cases. See id. at 63-64.
In short, the prohibition against defendants asserting their innocence, as well as
a concurrent entrapment defense, is patently illogical.

As such, it serves no valid

governmental purpose while, at the same time, significantly limiting the defendant's
ability to present a defense and put the State to its burden of proving his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, to the extent that that prohibition exists under law, it is
unwise and unjust, and should not be rejected.

3.

Mr. Barton's Proffered Entrapment Defense Was Not Necessarily
Inconsistent With His Claims Of Innocence

Assuming arguendo that the Idaho Court of Appeals correctly characterized
Idaho law in Suits /I when it asserted that "Idaho follows the rule prohibiting inconsistent
defenses," and that this Court rejects his request to overrule this rule, Mr. Barton
nevertheless contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a jury
instruction on the defense of entrapment. He asserts that, although he sought to offer
the jury two theories of defense-innocence and entrapment-those two theories were
not necessarily inconsistent.
First, these two theories are generally compatible.

As noted, the entrapment

analysis (under the subjective test) focuses on the subjective intent of the defendant,
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taking into account whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense or,
instead, was an innocent person lured into committing a crime. Thus, at its heart, the
entrapment defense turns on the belief that an otherwise innocent defendant who is
lured into committing a crime lacks the criminal intent necessary to be held criminally
responsible for that crime. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 218. Accordingly, even
in some states which employ the rule that defendants wishing to assert an entrapment
defense may not do so where that defense is inconsistent with their other defenses,
courts have held that defendants may assert the entrapment defense while claiming
innocence based on a lack of intent. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 381 S.E.2d 827, 83031 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defendant could assert an entrapment defense
where he denied the intent elements of the charged offenses, but admitted most of the
physical acts alleged).
defense theory.

In this case, of course, lack of intent was Mr. Barton's other

Since both his "entrapment" theory and his "innocence" theory were

based on a lack of intent, there is nothing inconsistent about them.
Second, based on the unique facts of this particular case, it is apparent that
Mr. Barton's defenses were compatible. Mr. Barton's "innocence" theory was based, in
large part, on his contention that he never intended to follow through on his agreement
with Mr. Dunlap insofar as he never intended to testify falsely at Mr. Taylor's trial. This
contention and, thus, the "innocence" theory, was therefore aimed primarily at Count II,
the conspiracy charge, which required the jury to find that Mr. Barton intended to
commit the crime of perjury.

(R., pp.229-30 (elements instruction for the conspiracy

charge), p.239 (supplemental instruction concerning the intent element of the
conspiracy charge).)

On the other hand, because the evidence shows that Mr. Barton

was far more reluctant (and, thus, needed more persuading) to go out and recruit
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Ms. Souza-Pena than he was to enter into the original agreement with Mr. Dunlap,
Mr. Barton's "entrapment" theory related more to Count I, the solicitation charge. Thus,
the jury could very well have found Mr. Barton's specific intent lacking and, therefore,
acquitted him on the conspiracy charge in Count" based on an "innocence" theory, and
found that all of the elements of solicitation were proven in Count I, but believed that he
was persuaded by Mr. Dunlap to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena and, therefore, acquitted him of
that charge based on an "entrapment" theory.25 In view of this practical reality, it should
be apparent that Mr. Barton's proposed defenses were not necessarily inconsistent.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Barton respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his conviction and sentence and remand his case to the district court for a new trial on
the solicitation charge.
DATED this 30 th day of September, 2011.

IK R. LEHTINEN"/
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

25 This is certainly not implausible, given that the jury actually hung on the conspiracy
charge (based, apparently, on a lack of proof as to the requisite mental state), but found
Mr. Barton guilty on the solicitation charge. Had an entrapment instruction been given,
the jury very well could have acquitted Mr. Barton on that count.
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